Multi-tenancy is the question a security review asks first, so here is the answer in detail rather than in principle.
Credentials
Every tenant gets its own set of credentials for everything the platform touches on its behalf: source control, object storage, the build runtime, model providers. No credential is shared between tenants, and no credential is ever reused across tenants even when the underlying service is shared.
A tenant’s credentials are scoped to that tenant’s resources where the provider supports it — a storage prefix, a repository, a namespace. Where a provider does not support scoping, the platform brokers access through its own service account and applies the tenant boundary in the application layer; this is called out in the data-handling documentation for the specific provider.
Quotas and limits
| Limit | Scope | Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| Concurrent builds | Tenant | Claimed at the queue; excess waits |
| Build minutes | Tenant | Metered, checked before a build starts |
| Environment hours | Tenant | Metered from ready to teardown |
| Storage | Tenant | Prefixed and quota-checked |
| Concurrent trial environments | Tenant | Enforced at provisioning |
| API rate limit | Token | Per endpoint class |
Quota checks happen before work starts, not after. A tenant that has exhausted its build minutes is told before the build is queued rather than after it has run.
Storage
Object storage is namespaced by tenant, and every object key is prefixed with the tenant id. Access to a prefix requires the tenant’s own credentials; there is no code path that reads another tenant’s prefix.
The trial environment’s storage is owned by the environment and destroyed with it. There is no shared volume between environments.
The build runtime
Each build runs in its own container.
- Read-only root filesystem. The build cannot write outside its declared output paths.
- Egress allowlist. The container can reach only the dependency registries and mock services the build declared. A build that attempts any other outbound connection is blocked and recorded.
- No host access. No host filesystem, no host network, no metadata service.
- No shared runtime state. Each build gets its own temporary workspace, discarded afterwards.
- Explicit secret injection. Secrets enter the process as environment variables or mounted files, are scoped to the build, and are never written to the build log. The log records which secret names were present, never their values.
The trial environment
Each trial environment is a single-tenant container with its own credentials, its own hostname, and its own outbound allowlist. It cannot reach other tenants’ environments, and it has no route to the control plane’s internal networks.
The environment’s lifetime is bounded: it is destroyed on request, or automatically after its idle window.
Network boundaries
internet
│
┌───────┴────────┐
│ edge / CDN │ static content, TLS termination, WAF
└───────┬────────┘
│
┌───────┴────────┐
│ control plane │ single service, tenant-scoped queries
└───────┬────────┘
│
┌───────┴────────┐
│ build workers │ per-build containers, egress allowlist
└───────┬────────┘
│
┌───────┴────────┐
│ trial envs │ per-tenant containers, no lateral routes
└────────────────┘
Lateral movement between tenants is not prevented by policy inside the application; it is prevented by the absence of a network path. Trial environments have no route to the control plane’s internal segment and no route to each other.
What a tenant administrator can see
A tenant administrator can see their own tenant’s builds, environments, usage, members and audit trail. They cannot see any other tenant’s existence, usage pattern, or data.
What we cannot claim
We do not claim the absence of vulnerabilities. Isolation is a design property we test and reason about; it is not a proof, and software with a shell is software with a shell.
What we can claim is that a compromise of one tenant’s environment does not, by design, provide a path into another tenant’s data — and that the build and trial runtimes are the parts of the system where untrusted code executes, so they are the parts that get the most attention.